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Tobias Krettenauer
Wilfrid Laurier University
This meta-analytic review of 42 studies covering 8,009 participants (ages 4–20) examines the relation of moral
emotion attributions to prosocial and antisocial behavior. A signiﬁcant association is found between moral
emotion attributions and prosocial and antisocial behaviors (d = .26, 95% CI [.15, .38]; d = .39, 95% CI [.29,
.49]). Effect sizes differ considerably across studies and this heterogeneity is attributed to moderator variables.
Speciﬁcally, effect sizes for predicted antisocial behavior are larger for self-attributed moral emotions than for
emotions attributed to hypothetical story characters. Effect sizes for prosocial and antisocial behaviors are
associated with several other study characteristics. Results are discussed with respect to the potential signiﬁ-
cance of moral emotion attributions for the social behavior of children and adolescents.
A central developmental approach to the study of
moral emotions has been to focus on moral emotion
attributions (Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006). Moral
emotion attributions are deﬁned as emotions that
children and adolescents attribute to an actor as a
consequence of a morally relevant action. Theoreti-
cally, moral emotion attributions can be both nega-
tive and positive depending on the type of action
(e.g., guilt over a moral transgression, pride over
prosocial actions, respectively). Previous research
on moral emotion attributions has focused mostly
on negatively charged moral emotions (e.g., guilt
and shame) at the expense of positive emotions
(e.g., pride; for exceptions, see Krettenauer & John-
ston, 2011; Malti, Killen, & Gasser, 2012). Moral
emotion attributions have a strong cognitive com-
ponent, as children need to consider the perspec-
tives of both the self and others in the context of a
morally relevant action (Malti, Gummerum, Keller,
& Buchmann, 2009). These attributions help chil-
dren anticipate the outcomes of sociomoral events
and adjust their moral behavior accordingly (Arse-
nio et al., 2006). Thus, moral emotion attributions
are considered important to the development of
(im)moral action tendencies (Hoffman, 2000; Malti
& Latzko, 2010).
As ﬁrst documented by Nunner-Winkler and
Sodian (1988), young children around the age of
4–5 years have no difﬁculties understanding acts of
victimization as morally wrong from a cognitive
point of view. Nonetheless, they often fail to attri-
bute moral emotions of guilt or remorse following a
moral transgression. Instead, children at this age
focus on the positive emotional outcomes of moral
infractions, such as happiness over having achieved
a desired object (the so-called happy-victimizer
response pattern). It is typically not before the age
of 7–8 years that children anticipate negatively
charged self-evaluative emotions as a consequence
of moral transgressions. The occurrence of the
happy-victimizer response pattern has been repli-
cated many times (for overviews, see Arsenio et al.,
2006; Krettenauer, Malti, & Sokol, 2008). Despite
these important ﬁndings and a signiﬁcant increase
in the number of relevant studies during the last
decade, the reasons as to why the happy-victimizer
phenomenon occurs and its relation to morally rele-
vant behavior remain largely unexplored.
In the present study, morally relevant behavior
was considered to be either prosocial or antisocial.
Prosocial behavior was deﬁned as behavior through
which a child beneﬁts others (Eisenberg, 1982). Sim-
ilarly, antisocial behavior was deﬁned as behavior
through which a child causes physical or psycho-
logical harm to others, including, but not limited to,The authors are grateful to Isabella Schwyzer for her help in
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behavior evaluated at the syndrome or symptom
level (i.e., broadband externalizing behavior prob-
lems vs. speciﬁc expressions of externalizing behav-
ior such as proactive aggression, respectively;
Orobio de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Mons-
houwer, 2002). Although prosocial and antisocial
behaviors seem to be at opposite ends of a single
dimension, they are conceptually distinct and have
unique correlates (Krueger, Hicks, & McGue, 2001).
Whether or not moral emotion attributions impede
antisocial behavior and facilitate prosocial behavior
are therefore distinct research questions. Thus, the
present meta-analysis considered prosocial and
antisocial behaviors as separate outcomes.
Theoretically, the happy-victimizer paradigm
constitutes a key theoretical approach to investigat-
ing the affective antecedents of morally relevant
behavior. According to Arsenio et al. (2006), differ-
ent types of events have different emotional out-
comes, and children become increasingly able to
fully understand and apply these affect–event links.
This might help children coordinate their own neg-
ative emotional experiences with their observations
and might help lay a foundation for emerging prin-
ciples of fairness and care, as well as guide action
tendencies. The view that happy emotion attribu-
tions are linked to aggression, challenges the
assumption that aggression is exclusively linked
with anger (but see Hubbard, Morrow, Romano, &
McAuliffe, 2010). There is increasing evidence that
unprovoked aggression is problematic when it is
associated with children’s expectation that it will
make them feel positive. Thus, happy victimization
is one of the two most problematic emotion attribu-
tions that contribute to externalizing psychopathol-
ogy (Arsenio, 2010). Vice versa, negative emotion
attributions indicate guilt feelings and are, as such,
similar to empathy, key antecedents of prosocial
behavior (Malti, Gummerman, et al., 2009).
Theoretical Links Between Moral Emotion Attributions
and Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior
From the perspective of cognitive development,
the decline of the happy-victimizer response pattern
in childhood and the corresponding increase in neg-
ative or ambivalent emotion attributions seem to be
hardly surprising. It has been well documented that
young children’s understanding of mixed emotions
is limited (e.g., Harter & Buddin, 1987). The under-
standing that a moral transgression may cause posi-
tive and negative emotions at the same time
requires cognitive mapping skills that typically
develop around the age of 7 years (Mascolo &
Fischer, 2010). In a similar vein, it has been argued
that happy-victimizer responses reﬂect limitations
in young children’s perspective-taking skills (Krette-
nauer et al., 2008). Hence, from a cognitive perspec-
tive, the development of children’s moral emotion
attributions is an epiphenomenon of cognitive
development.
However, this interpretation falls short of the
important ﬁnding that moral emotion attributions,
as studied in happy-victimizer research, have been
repeatedly found to predict children’s prosocial and
antisocial behavior. Many theorists consider the
manifestation of self-evaluative emotions (particu-
larly guilt) to be an important indicator of a per-
son’s readiness to comply with standards and rules
(Hoffman, 2000). These emotions indicate that a
moral norm has been internalized (Kochanska &
Thompson, 1997). From this perspective, the happy-
victimizer response pattern indicates a lack of
moral motivation in young children (Nunner-Win-
kler, 2007). Correspondingly, the increase in moral
emotion attributions in childhood reﬂects a devel-
opmental process in which moral judgments are
increasingly experienced as personally binding
(Nunner-Winkler, 2007).
This motivational interpretation of the happy-vic-
timizer response pattern is contradicted by the
well-documented ﬁnding that children, at a very
young age, spontaneously engage in the prosocial
actions of sharing, helping, and consoling others
(e.g., Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). The notion of a
general lack of moral motivation in early childhood
is implausible. Moreover, a motivational interpreta-
tion does not take into account that moral emotion
attributions predict behavior even when the happy-
victimizer response pattern has long disappeared.
As documented by Johnston and Krettenauer (2011)
and Krettenauer and Eichler (2006), it appears that
adolescents very rarely anticipate plain positive
emotions when transgressing a moral rule; nonethe-
less, the strength of moral emotion attributions pre-
dicts everyday prosocial and antisocial behavior in
this age group. Similar ﬁndings were obtained
with adolescents scoring high on aggressive behav-
ior in comparison with non-aggressive peers (e.g.,
Arsenio, Adams, & Gold, 2009; Arsenio, Gold, &
Adams, 2004). These ﬁndings correspond with
research demonstrating that at-risk children with
elevated scores of externalizing behavioral problems
more often evidence happy-victimizer responses
(e.g., Malti, Gasser, & Buchmann, 2009). Thus,
moral emotion attributions, as assessed in happy-
victimizer research, might reﬂect individual differ-
ences with regard to morally relevant behavioral
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dispositions. In line with this view, Krettenauer,
Asendorpf, and Nunner-Winkler (2011) found that
the personality traits of conscientiousness and
agreeableness predicted the development of moral
emotion attributions from childhood to middle ado-
lescence.
Moral emotion attributions, as studied in happy-
victimizer research, thus allow for a variety of inter-
pretations. The major goal of the present meta-analy-
sis is to disambiguate this situation. Over the past
decade, there has been a tremendous increase in the
number of studies on the relation betweenmoral emo-
tion attributions and the prosocial and antisocial
behavior of children and adolescents. This body of
research provides an excellent opportunity to investi-
gate how moral emotion attributions relate to behav-
ior at different developmental periods and across a
broad range of studies; this should reduce some of the
ambiguity around moral emotion attributions. If
results indicate that moral emotion attributions, over-
all, are unrelated to both prosocial and antisocial
behavior in childhood and adolescence, a primarily
cognitive interpretationmight be warranted. If, on the
other hand, results demonstrate that moral emotion
attributions are associated with social behavior in
childhood, but not in adolescence, this would support
the view that moral emotion attributions rest on the
emergence of a particular type of moral motivation in
childhood. Finally, if results show that moral emotion
attributions are similarly predictive of social behavior
across various ages, this would support the view
that moral emotion attributions likely reﬂect individ-
ual differences in morally relevant behavioral
dispositions.
At this point, it is important to note that the
three interpretations outlined above (i.e., cognitive,
motivational, dispositional) are not mutually exclu-
sive but, in fact, might reﬂect different facets of the
development of moral emotion attributions. Thus,
the present meta-analysis does not provide a critical
test that will allow the deﬁnitive ruling out of one
of these interpretations; rather, it is an attempt to
disambiguate the concept of moral emotion attribu-
tions to clarify the role that moral emotion attribu-
tions play in moral development and morally
relevant behavior. In a similar vein, it should be
explicitly noted that the exact mechanism that links
moral emotion attributions with prosocial and anti-
social behavior is beyond the scope of the present
study. Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek (2007)
argued that moral emotions relate to moral behav-
ior in two ways, that is, as consequential emotions
following actual behavior and as anticipatory emo-
tions when evaluating behavioral alternatives (see
also Baumeister, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). Thus,
moral emotion attributions may, at the same time,
reﬂect past emotional experiences and represent
emotion expectations. However, moral emotion
attributions may relate to behavior primarily as
emotion expectations because it is the expectancy of
certain emotional outcomes, rather than their post
hoc experience, that can be assumed to inﬂuence
decision making (Lake, Lane, & Harris, 1995).
Potential Moderators of the Relation Between Moral
Emotion Attributions and Social Behavior
Age might be an important moderator of the
relation between moral emotion attributions and
social behavior, and it might help clarify the role
that moral emotion attributions play in moral
development. If the relation between moral emotion
attributions and social behavior decreases with age,
this would indicate that eventually all children
acquire a certain type of moral motivation as they
overcome the happy-victimizer response pattern. If,
on the other hand, the relation between moral emo-
tion attributions and social behavior does not
change, or even increases, with age, this would sug-
gest that moral emotion attributions primarily
reﬂect important individual differences in morally
relevant behavior; these differences emerge early in
the course of development and might become
increasingly stable over time.
A second potential moderator concerns the type
of behavior under study. Hypothetical scenarios in
happy-victimizer research commonly assess moral
emotion attributions by depicting rule transgres-
sions and actions that are harmful to others (e.g.,
stealing, pushing another child off a swing); thus,
they reﬂect emotion attributions primarily in the
context of antisocial behavior. Due to close thematic
correspondence, moral emotion attributions, as
assessed in happy-victimizer research, might be
more strongly related to antisocial than to prosocial
behavior.
Keller, Lourenço, Malti, and Saalbach (2003)
demonstrated that it is important to distinguish
between attributions of moral emotions to the self
and attributions of moral emotions to others. Other-
attributions refer to the protagonist’s feelings in a
hypothetical situation (“How would the protagonist
feel?”), whereas self-attributed emotions indicate
the emotions that participants would anticipate for
themselves if they were in the protagonist’s shoes
(“How would you feel?”). Self- and other-attribu-
tions can be related to behavior in different ways.
When asked about other-attributions, children may
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approach the task from an informational, third-per-
son viewpoint, based on what they know about
other people and how these other people behave.
Self-attributed emotions, by contrast, more likely
reﬂect the individual’s ﬁrst-person experiences. This
argument is supported by research on relations
between children’s prosocial behavior and moral
judgments. For example, Eisenberg, Pasternack,
Cameron, and Kelly (1984) documented stronger
relations between prosocial behavior and self-
attributed reasoning compared to other-attributed
reasoning. Consequently, we would expect self-
attributed emotions to be more strongly related
than other-attributed emotions to behavior (Malti,
2007).
Similarly, the way emotion attributions are
assessed may moderate the link between emotion
attributions and social behavior. Studies have uti-
lized different assessment formats; that is, some
have assessed moral emotion attributions dichoto-
mously (present vs. absent), whereas others have
measured the intensity or strength of moral emo-
tion attributions. Furthermore, some studies have
combined emotion attributions with moral reason-
ing, yielding an assessment of reﬂexive moral emo-
tions. Intensity reﬂects an important experiential
quality of emotions that is left out in dichotomous
measures of emotion attributions. From this per-
spective, measures of intensity can be expected to
be superior to dichotomous measures, which may
result in a stronger link to social behavior. The
additional consideration of moral reasoning, by
contrast, may not strengthen this link, as moral
reasoning generally has been shown to be only
weakly related to behavior (Krebs & Denton, 2005).
Another potential moderator of the relation
between emotion attributions and social behavior
concerns how social behavior is assessed. A study
by Malti, Gummerman, et al. (2009) suggests that
observed behavior is more closely related to moral
emotion attributions than other-reported behavior.
This might reﬂect the fact that observed or
self-reported behavior more closely reﬂects the
children’s conceptions of sociomoral events and,
therefore, might relate more closely to what
children say they would feel in similar hypothetical
situations than would other-reports. Thus, the
assessment method of prosocial or antisocial behav-
ior might account for some of the variability in the
relevant ﬁndings.
Similarly, the domain in which social behavior is
measured might serve as a potential moderator of
the relation between emotion attributions and social
behavior. To illustrate, prosocial behavior measured
in one speciﬁc domain, for example, sharing behav-
ior, might be more closely related to emotion attri-
butions about (non)sharing than are broadband
measures of behavior, for example, overt trait pro-
social behavior (including a variety of subdimen-
sions such as sharing, helping, cooperating, etc.).
Similarly, studies that assess physical aggression
might more closely relate to moral emotion attribu-
tions about physical harm than would studies that
measure overt externalizing behavior, as this
includes a wide variety of problem behaviors.
Other study characteristics might also function
as moderators of the relation between moral emo-
tion attributions and behavior. Some studies have
used an extreme-group design to examine the rela-
tion between emotion attributions and behavior
(e.g., clinically referred children; see Arsenio &
Fleiss, 1996), whereas others have relied on unse-
lected samples of children (e.g., Krettenauer &
Eichler, 2006). Studies with extreme groups may
yield relatively large effect sizes because the
extreme ends of antisocial and prosocial behavior
might relate more closely to happy victimization or
the anticipation of guilt feelings, respectively (Arsenio
et al., 2006). Furthermore, studies utilizing experi-
mental designs (e.g., Lake et al., 1995) might yield
stronger effect sizes than studies with correlational
designs (e.g., Dunn & Hughes, 2000). In addition,
whereas some studies have been cross-sectional
(Gasser & Keller, 2009), others have relied on longitu-
dinal samples (Malti, Gummerman, et al., 2009); as a
result of selective attrition, the effect sizes of
longitudinal and cross-sectional studies may differ. In
addition, as a result of publication bias, published
studies might report higher effect sizes than those
reported in unpublished studies (Rosenthal, 1995).
Finally, it is plausible to assume that the relation
between moral emotion attributions and social behav-
ior is moderated by gender, although studies on the
relation between emotion attributions and behavior
have typically not reported separate effect sizes for
boys and girls. An exception is a study by Malti,
Gummerum, and Buchmann (2007), who found that
moral emotion attributions predicted prosocial behav-
ior better in boys than in girls. We therefore included
tests of gender as a moderator of the relation
between emotion attributions and behavior.
Our meta-analysis included a sample of 42 studies
with more than 8,000 participants. The primary mea-
sures were moral emotion attributions and prosocial
and antisocial behavior. We hypothesized that moral
emotion attributions would be positively related to
prosocial behavior as well as negatively related
to antisocial behavior. Stronger effects were expected
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for self-attributed moral emotions than for other-
attributed moral emotions. We included age as a
moderator to test whether the relation between moral
emotion attributions and social behavior changes
over time or remains stable. Finally, we examined the
relevance of a variety of methodological factors that
might contribute to systematic differences in effect
size, including how moral emotion attributions and
social behavior were assessed, study type, and gender
of study participants.
Method
Study Selection
Our meta-analytic review included all empirical
studies conducted between January 1970 and April
2011, which investigated the relation between moral
emotions and social (prosocial and antisocial)
behavior in children and adolescents.
Studies were selected in three steps to avoid
biased retrieval of studies published in the major
journals; the tendency of major journals is to only
publish results with large effect sizes (Rosenthal,
1995). First, a large group of studies was retrieved
by searches in PsychInfo (http://www.psycinfo.
com) and Dissertation Abstracts Online (www.umi.
com). The following keywords were speciﬁed in
varying combinations: moral emotion, emotion attri-
bution, action*, moral*, emotion*, action*, behav-
ior*, behavio*problem*. The search was limited to
human children and adolescents. The languages
were English, French, Italian, and German. Second,
additional studies were obtained by consulting
authors of relevant articles, the reference lists from
Arsenio et al. (2006) and from Eisenberg, Spinrad,
and Sadovsky (2006), and the proceedings from the
2007 conference of the Society for Research in Child
Development. Third, we perused the reference sec-
tions of reports in the databases. This search yielded
several hundred studies.
Inclusion Criteria
To be selected for inclusion in the meta-analysis,
the reports had to meet the following criteria: (a)
inclusion of empirical data on both moral emotions
and social behavior in children or adolescents, (b)
operationalization of moral emotions as emotion
attributions to wrongdoers or to the self in the role
of the wrongdoer, (c) participant ages between 4.0
and 20.0 years, and (d) no data that had already
been reported in other articles included in the
meta-analysis. We focused on 4- to 20-year-olds
because the attribution of emotions to protagonists
in moral conﬂict situations typically requires the-
ory-of-mind skills (Malti & Ongley, in press). This
is the main reason why the existing studies in the
happy-victimizer tradition typically do not investi-
gate children younger than 4 years of age; in fact,
most of the research on moral emotion attributions
deals with children or adolescents. Thus, an age
range from 4 to 20 years provides the most reliable
database for investigating age as a potential moder-
ator.
Copies of all suitable journal articles, manu-
scripts under submission or revision, unpublished
articles, and dissertations were obtained. In the
very few cases where an author failed to report suf-
ﬁcient statistical information to compute an effect
size, attempts were made to contact the authors for
additional information. In the very few cases where
this was impossible, effect sizes were estimated
using the reported signiﬁcance level.
For antisocial behavior, we considered all behav-
iors through which a child intentionally caused
physical or psychological harm to others. This
included dispositional, broadband measures, such
as the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) externaliz-
ing scale (e.g., Malti & Keller, 2009), as well as
domain-speciﬁc measures, such as physical or pro-
active aggression (e.g., Arsenio et al., 2009). For
prosocial behavior, we considered all behaviors
through which a child beneﬁted others. Again, this
included broadband measures, such as the overt
prosocial behavior scale as measured by the
Strength and Difﬁculties Questionnaire (SDQ; e.g.,
Malti, Gummerman, et al., 2009), as well as
domain-speciﬁc measures, such as observed sharing
behavior as measured by the dictator game (e.g.,
Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel,
2010). Higher scores indicated higher levels of anti-
social behavior or prosocial behavior, respectively.
Table 1 gives an overview of the ﬁnal sample of
studies included in the meta-analysis.
Coding of Study Characteristics
To examine potential moderators of the relation
between moral emotion attributions and prosocial
and antisocial behavior, each study was coded for
10 characteristics in a manner similar to Orobio de
Castro et al. (2002). These characteristics were the
type of moral emotion attribution (self vs. other),
age of participants (range = 4.0–20.0 years), coding
of moral emotion attribution (positive or negative
vs. intensity vs. combined emotion attribution and
reasoning score), gender of participants (male and
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female vs. male only; there were no studies with
female-only samples), method of assessing social
behavior (self-report and observation vs. adult or
peer report), measure of social behavior (broad-
band-dispositional measure vs. domain-speciﬁc
measures), study format (cross-sectional vs. longitu-
dinal), study type (experiment vs. correlational),
sampling strategy (extreme group [i.e., clinical sam-
ple and criminal offenders] vs. community sample),
and publication status (published vs. unpublished).
The categorization of type of moral emotion
attribution in self- versus other-attributed emotions
followed the conceptual distinction in the literature
(Keller et al., 2003). The categorization of the age
Table 1
Characteristics of the Sample Studies
Source MEA Behavior n da
Arsenio et al. (2009) S A 100 0.52
Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) O A 48 1.09
Arsenio et al. (2004) S A 100 0.56
Asendorpf and Nunner-Winkler (1992) O A 153 0.28
Blair (1997) O A 32 0.72
Cimbora (1997) O A 63 0.72
Dill (2008) S B 55 0.75/0.77
Dunn and Hughes (2000) O A 80 0.56
Garner (1996) O P 40 0.14
Gasser and Malti (2011) O A 237 0.30
Gasser, Malti, and Gutzwiller-Helfenﬁnger (2010) O A 139 0.14
Gasser and Keller (2009) S A 212 0.28
Gini (2006) O B 204 0.40/0.26
Gummerum et al. (2010) S P 40 0.70
Haimowitz (1996) S A 126 1.28
Hawley (2003) S A 163 0.32
Holmqvist (2008) S A 47 1.09
Hosser et al. (2008) S A 1243 0.27
Hughes and Dunn (2000) O A 80 0.54
Humphries (2001) S B 60 0.26/0.37
Johnston and Krettenauer (2011) S B 205 0.32/0.72
Krettenauer et al. (2011) S A 143 0.69
Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) S A 200 0.47
Lake et al. (1995) O A 60 1.04
Latzko (2011) O A 80 0.47
Liao (1998) S A 200 0.32
Lotze, Ravindran, and Myers (2010) S A 50 0.68
Lyon (2001) O A 79 0.45
Malti (2007) S A 150 0.28
Malti, Gasser, et al. (2009) S A 371 0.12
Malti, Gasser, and Gutzwiller-Helfendinger (2010) O B 312 0.12/0.24
Malti et al. (2007) S P 208 0.14
Malti, Gummerum, et al. (2009), Study 1 S P 1273 0.14
Malti, Gummerum, et al. (2009), Study 2 S P 175 0.08
Malti and Keller (2009) S A 152 0.58
Manning (2004) S A 132 0.47
McInerney (1995) S B 80 0.45/0.37
Menesini and Camodeca (2008) S B 121 0.86/0.27
Menesini et al. (2003) S A 179 0.80
Perren, Gutzwiller- Helfenﬁnger, Malti, and Hymel (2011) O A 516 0.18
Van Tijen, Stegge, Meerum Terwogt, and Panhuis (2004) S A 88 0.53
Woolgar, Steele, Steele, Yabsley, and Fonagy (2001) O B 100 0.16/0.08
Note. MEA = moral emotion attribution; S = self-attributed emotions; O = other-attributed emotions; A = antisocial; P = prosocial;
B = both prosocial and antisocial behavior.
aThe ﬁrst effect size is for prosocial behavior, the second for antisocial behavior.
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groups was based on previous studies demonstrat-
ing that important changes take place in the devel-
opment of moral emotions between early and
middle childhood and between middle childhood
and early adolescence (Krettenauer et al., 2008; Mal-
ti & Keller, 2010). The intent was to create age
groups that represent early and middle childhood,
as well as the differences between early, middle,
and late adolescence. Moreover, the categorization
of coding of moral emotion attribution followed the
distinctions made in the literature; whereas some
studies simply coded positive versus negative or
mixed feelings (e.g., Malti, 2007), other studies
assessed the intensity of negative emotion attribu-
tion (e.g., Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006). A few of
these studies measured a continuum from positive
to negative emotions rather than intensity of nega-
tive emotion attribution (e.g., Arsenio et al., 2009).
Finally, some studies assessed a combined emotion
attribution and reasoning score that takes into
account the justiﬁcation for the negative emotion
attribution (such as moral vs. sanction-oriented
justiﬁcation of negative emotion attribution; e.g.,
Gasser & Keller, 2009). In addition, the categoriza-
tion of domain of social behavior in broadband-
versus domain-speciﬁc behavior was based on pre-
vious research indicating that domain-speciﬁc
behavior (such as proactive aggression or sharing)
might be more closely related to deﬁcits in moral
emotion attributions than broadband behavior mea-
sures (such as externalizing behaviors or broadband
prosocial behavior scales) are, because domain-
speciﬁc behaviors typically assess similar domains
to the happy-victimizer vignettes (e.g., not sharing).
To assess reliability, two coders independently
coded a randomly selected subsample of 17 studies
(40% of the data). The kappa coefﬁcients for the
study variables were as follows: type of social
behavior j = 1.00, type of moral emotion attribu-
tion j = .89, age group j = .84, gender j = 1.00,
type of behavior report measure j = .85, domain of
behavior report measure j = 1.00, study type
j = 1.00, study format j = 1.00, study sample
j = 1.00, publication status j = 1.00. The average
interrater agreement across the 10 variables was
j = .96. The raters discussed their disagreements
until a consensus was reached; the consensus then
became the code.
Data Analyses
Data analyses were carried out on Mullen’s
(1989) algorithms. All outcomes were transformed
to Fisher Z values, which corrected for nonlinearity
due to extreme values. The Z values were calcu-
lated from the reported statistics. In the case of
studies for which only means and standard devia-
tions were reported, t tests were conducted. When
a report did not provide the statistical information
necessary to calculate an effect size for a nonsigniﬁ-
cant result, an effect size of zero was assigned
based on a one-tailed p of .50 (Z = 0). This com-
monly used, conservative strategy underestimates
the true magnitude of effect sizes (Stams et al.,
2006), but exclusion of these nonsigniﬁcant results
would have resulted in an overestimation of the
magnitude of the combined effect-size estimate.
One longitudinal study (Krettenauer et al., 2011)
measured both other- and self-attributed emotions
at different time points. Because more measure-
ments on self-attributed emotions than on other-
attributed emotions were included in data analysis,
these were coded as self-attributed emotions.
In eight studies (Asendorpf & Nunner-Winkler,
1992; Cimbora, 1997; Gasser & Keller, 2009; Lake
et al., 1995; Liao, 1998; Lyon, 2001; Malti, 2007;
Malti & Keller, 2009), F values were given and
were transformed into r values according to the for-
mula √r2 = F/F – 2 + n (Cohen, 1988). In two stud-
ies (Hosser, Windzio, & Greve, 2008; Menesini
et al., 2003), b coefﬁcients were transformed into
correlation coefﬁcients according to the formula
r = b + .05k, where k = 1 if b is nonnegative and
0 if b is negative (see Peterson & Brown, 2005).
Correlation coefﬁcients were interpreted following
Cohen’s conventions (Cohen, 1988; Cohen & Cohen,
1983); accordingly, correlations of .20, .50, and .80
were taken to represent small, moderate, and large
effect sizes, respectively. The data analyses were
performed using the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis
(CMA) program, version 2 (Borenstein, Hedges,
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2004). To obtain a single
effect size per study, multiple effect sizes from a
study were averaged, and one effect size per study
was calculated for each outcome variable.
The ﬁnal model computes ﬁxed and random
effect sizes. Although a ﬁxed-effects model allows
greater statistical power, a random-effects model
allows greater generalizability. We therefore report
only the results from random-effects models.
We also computed signiﬁcance tests for the effect
sizes, homogeneity tests, analyses of variance, conﬁ-
dence intervals around the point estimate of the
effect size, and p2, the last being the moment-based
estimate of the between-studies variance. Signiﬁcant
heterogeneity indicates the need for a moderator
analysis that explains variability across studies. This
was analyzed through the Q statistic. We calculated
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unbiased d values to eliminate the effect size bias
caused by small sample sizes.
Publication bias was assessed by calculating the
fail-safe number, which is the number of additional
hypothetical studies with an average null result
required to make the overall effect nonsigniﬁcant
(Rosenthal, 1995).
Results
The meta-analysis included 42 studies with 8,009
participants. Table 2 describes the characteristics of
the 42 studies. As can be observed, the studies vary
considerably in sample size (32–1,273, M = 190.69,
SD = 260.02), with 22% of the sample being 4–
6 years of age, 48% being 7–10 years of age, 7%
being 11–13 years of age, and 22% being 14–
20 years of age. Aggressive behavior was assessed
in 29 studies (69%) and prosocial behavior was
assessed in the remaining 13 studies, 9 of which
also assessed aggressive behavior. Self-attributed
emotions were included in 26 studies (62%) and
other-attributed emotions were included in the
remaining 16 studies (38%). Eighteen studies (43%)
coded moral emotion attributions in a binary man-
ner (i.e., positive vs. negative or mixed), 15 studies
coded the intensity of moral emotion attribution
(36%), and 9 studies coded combined moral emo-
tion attribution and reasoning scores (21%). Most
studies included mixed-gender samples (90%). In
regard to the method of behavioral assessment, 25
studies used adult-rated social behavior (59%), 5
used self-reported social behavior (17%), 5 used
peer reports (12%), and 7 used observed behavior
(12%). Twenty-six of the studies used broadband-
dispositional behavior report measures (62%), and
the remaining 16 studies used situation-speciﬁc
measures (38%). The studies were predominantly
correlational (95%) and cross-sectional (76%), and
they tended to use community samples (71%).
Twenty-eight of the studies were published (67%),
with the remaining 14 studies being either unpub-
lished or submitted for publication (33%). All but
one of the 28 published studies appeared in peer-
reviewed journals.
Overall Effect Size
The meta-analysis (random-effects model) yielded
a highly signiﬁcant result for the overall relation
between emotion attributions and combined proso-
cial and aggressive behavior (Z = 8.07, p < .001). The
effect size was moderate (Cohen’s d = .37), with 95%
CI [.28, .45]; r(mean) = .18, p < .001, 95% CI [.14,
.22]. The mean effect size should be interpreted cau-
tiously, however, because effects sizes were heteroge-
neous across studies,Q(41) = 123.95, p < .001 for d.
The distribution of effect sizes was lower for pro-
social than that for aggressive behavior. For proso-
cial behavior, the overall effect size was small,
r = .13, p < .001, 95% CI [.08, .19]; d = .26, 95% CI
[.15, .38]; Q(12) = 18.22, p < .10 for d. The effect
for prosocial behavior was in the hypothesized
direction in all 13 studies for which it was assessed,
and in 7 of these the effect was signiﬁcant (p < .05).
For aggressive behavior, the overall effect size was
moderate, r = .19, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .25]; d = .39,
95% CI [.29, .49]; Q(36) = 141.43, p < .001 for d. Of
the 37 studies assessing aggressive behavior, the
effect was in the hypothesized direction in 33 of
them, and signiﬁcantly so in 27 of them (p < .05).
Moderators of Effect Size
Random-effects moderator analyses were con-
ducted in an effort to explain the signiﬁcant hetero-
Table 2
Summary of Study Characteristics Included in Meta-Analyses
Frequencies (%) studies
Type of behavior
Prosocial/antisocial/both 5 (12)/29 (69)/8 (19)
Type of moral
emotion attribution
Other/self 16 (38)/26 (62)
Age group
0/1/2/3 9 (22)/20 (48)/3
(7)/9 (22)
Coding of moral
emotion attribution
Binary score/intensity score/
combined emotion-reasoning score
18 (43)/15 (36)/9 (21)
Gender
Mixed/boys only 38 (90)/4 (10)
Type of behavior report measure
Self-report/observation/
adult-report/peer-report
5 (17)/7(12)/25
(59)/5 (12)
Domain of behavior report measures
Broadband-dispositional/
situation-speciﬁc
26 (62)/16 (38)
Study type
Experimental/correlational 2 (5)/40 (95)
Study format
Cross-sectional/longitudinal 32 (76)/10 (24)
Study sample
Extreme group/community 12 (29)/30 (71)
Publication status
Published/unpublished 28 (67)/14 (33)
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geneity of the effect sizes (Mullen, 1989). Table 3
summarizes the moderators for prosocial and anti-
social behavior. First, we examined our hypothesis
about the role of self- versus other-attributed emo-
tions in prosocial and antisocial behavior. For pro-
social behavior, there was no signiﬁcant difference
in effect size between self- and other-attributed
emotions, Q(1) = .73. For antisocial behavior, how-
ever, the effect size was higher for self- than for
other-attributed emotions, d = .47, p < .001 versus
Table 3
Summary of Meta-Analytic Results on the Effects of Moderators on Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior
Outcome
Prosocial Antisocial
Heterogeneity Q (df) 18.22a (12) 113.43*** (36)
Random-effects mean r .13*** .20***
95% CI .08, .19 .15, .25
Equivalent d .26*** .40***
95% CI .15, .38 .30, .50
Moderators r (k) Q (between) Z r (k) Q (between) Z
Moral emotion attribution
Other .11** (4) 0.73 2.72** .13** (15) 4.66* 2.93**
Self .16*** (9) 3.93*** .23*** (22) 8.32***
Age group
4–6 .20 (4)** 9.35a 3.41** .20 (8)*** 9.45 4.41***
7–10 .11 (7)** 1.53 .14 (17)*** 3.50***
11–13 .22 (1)* 3.78*** .29 (3)*** 1.26
14–20 .16 (1)* 2.29* .25 (9)*** 5.89***
Coding of moral
emotion attribution
Dichotomous score (i.e.,
positive vs. negative)
.12 (6)** 9.23* 3.30** .13 (16)** 7.07* 3.03**
Intensity score .25 (4)*** 4.46*** .27 (15)*** 7.21***
Combined emotion-reasoning score .07 (3)** 2.67** .20 (6)*** 5.26***
Gender
Mixed No male only samples — — .19*** (33) 0.75 6.74***
Male only — — .27** (4) 3.18**
Assessment of social behaviorb
Self-report, observation, composite .12* (4) 0.20 2.46* .26*** (10) 2.24 4.59***
Other-report (peers or adults) .15*** (9) 3.94*** .17*** (27) .26***
Domain of social behavior
Broadband-dispositional .10*** (9) 2.10 4.41*** .22*** (23) 0.93 6.17***
Domain-speciﬁc-situational .21** (4) 2.69** .17** (14) 4.62***
Study type
Experimental Correlational only — — .42*** (2) 5.45* 4.23***
Correlational — — .19*** (35) 7.46***
Study format
Cross-sectional .18*** (10) 6.38* 5.90*** .20*** (30) 0.00 6.14***
Longitudinal .07** (3) 2.67** .20*** (7) 5.97***
Study sample
Extreme group Community samples only — — .22*** (12) 0.29 4.03***
Community — — .19*** (25) 6.33***
Publication status
Unpublished .21*** (5) 3.96* 4.60*** .25*** (13) 2.20 5.73***
Published .10** (8) 3.29* .17*** (24) 5.42***
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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d = .26, p < .01; Q(1) = 4.66, p < .01. In other words,
self-attributed emotions had a stronger relation than
other-attributed emotions on aggression.
Second, we investigated the effects of the other
moderators on the outcome variables. The signiﬁ-
cant moderators of prosocial behavior were coding
of moral emotion attribution, study format, and
publication status. Studies that coded intensity of
moral emotion attribution showed a larger effect
size (d = .50) than did studies that coded moral
emotion attributions in a binary manner (d = .24) or
as a combined emotion-reasoning score (d = .13), Q
(2) = 9.23, p < .05. Cross-sectional studies yielded a
larger effect size (d = .35) than did longitudinal
studies (d = .13), Q(1) = 6.38, p < .05. Unpublished
studies showed a larger effect size (d = .42) than
did published studies (d = .20), Q(1) = 7.18, p < .01.
The signiﬁcant moderators of antisocial behavior
were coding of moral emotion attribution and
study type. Studies that coded intensity of moral
emotion attribution showed a larger effect size
(d = .56) than did studies that coded moral emotion
attribution in a binary manner (d = .26) or as a
combined emotion-reasoning score (d = .39), Q(2) =
7.07, p < .05. Experimental studies had a larger
effect size (d = .91) than did correlational studies
(d = .38), Q(1) = 5.45, p < .05.
Next, we investigated whether or not the 10
moderators of effect size could account for the het-
erogeneity in the effect sizes for both prosocial and
antisocial behavior. Preliminary analyses revealed
that, with a few exceptions, the moderators were
not signiﬁcantly intercorrelated. All the studies that
examined prosocial behavior were correlational and
used mixed samples. Therefore, study type and
gender were excluded from the regression analysis.
However, the ﬁnal regression model of prosocial
behavior was not signiﬁcant.
Given the small sample size (n = 37), gender,
age, and study format were not included in the
ﬁnal regression model of antisocial behavior
because preliminary analyses indicated that these
variables did not signiﬁcantly predict aggressive
behavior and were, in part, interrelated with other
moderators. Thus, type of moral emotion attribu-
tion, coding of moral emotion attribution, assess-
ment of social behavior, domain of social behavior,
study type, study sample, and publication status
were entered into the equation (Table 4). The model
was signiﬁcant, Q(7, 36) = 2.64, p < .05, with the
moderators explaining 36% of the variance in
effect size. Two variables yielded independently
signiﬁcant effects. The ﬁrst of these was type of
moral emotion attribution (b = .42, p < .05), which
means that self-attributed emotions were more clo-
sely related to antisocial behavior than were other-
attributed emotions (Figure 1). The second was
study type (b = .36, p < .05), indicating that moral
emotion attributions were related more strongly to
antisocial behavior in experimental than that in in
correlational studies.
Publication Bias
Finally, we tested for publication bias by com-
puting fail-safe numbers (see Becker, 2005). Accord-
ing to Card, Stucky, Sawalani, and Little (2008,
p. 1202), “Failsafe numbers indicate the number of
studies with average effect sizes equal to zero that
would have to exist to conclude nonsigniﬁcant
effects. This number is meant to index the number
of studies with effect sizes of zero that could have
Table 4
Regression Model for Effect Size Moderators of Antisocial Behavior
(k = 37)
Moderators b
Type of moral emotion attribution .42*
Coding of moral emotion attribution .14
Assessment of social behavior .23
Domain of social behavior .05
Study type .36*
Study sample .06
Publication status .25
Note. Random-effects analysis; coefﬁcients are standardized.
*p < .05.
Antisocial Behavior (r)
Other-Attributed Emotions   Self-Attributed Emotions 
  .5 4 
6  .4 8 
4, 4  .3 2, 2, 4, 6, 7 
2, 3, 6, 7  .2 3, 3, 5, 5, 7, 8 
1, 1, 2  .1 3, 3, 4, 4, 6, 8, 8 
1, 1  .0 1 
0 -.0  
3 -.1 6 
-.2
 -.3  
8 -.4  
.13
53.28
 r 
Q
.23
77.62
Figure 1. Stem-and-leaf plot of associations of self- and other-
attributed emotions with antisocial behavior.
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been excluded from the meta-analysis before the
conclusions of signiﬁcance would be invalidated.”
In our study (N = 42), this number was 2,904, indi-
cating that more than 2,900 additional studies with
an average null result would be necessary to render
the overall combined probability nonsigniﬁcant.
The fail-safe number for studies measuring aggres-
sive behavior (n = 37) was 1,786, and, for studies
measuring prosocial behavior (n = 13), it was 123.
As a rule of thumb for determining the critical fail-
safe number that should be exceeded, Becker (2005)
suggested the formula Nmin = 5k + 10, with k refer-
ring to the number of studies included in the meta-
analysis.
Discussion
Stimulated by developmental research on the
happy-victimizer phenomenon (for overviews, see
Arsenio et al., 2006; Krettenauer et al., 2008),
researchers have begun to systematically study how
moral emotion attributions relate to prosocial and
antisocial behavior in childhood and adolescence.
The main goal of the present meta-analytic review
was to expand our understanding of the conceptual
role of moral emotion attributions in moral devel-
opment and morally relevant behavior. In addition,
we aimed to integrate the available evidence on the
role of moral emotion attributions in the prosocial
and antisocial behavior of children and adolescents
and to assess whether or not divergent ﬁndings can
be explained by differences in samples and proce-
dures. This is the ﬁrst meta-analytic review of a
rapidly increasing number of studies on the relation
between moral emotion attributions and children’s
social behavior.
The ﬁrst main ﬁnding of the meta-analysis,
which was based on a sample of 42 studies with
8,009 participants, revealed small-size relations of
emotion attributions with prosocial behavior and
moderate-size relations of emotion attributions with
antisocial behavior (d = .26 and .39, respectively).
This ﬁnding supports the theoretical proposition
that moral emotion attributions such as sadness
and guilt feelings play a signiﬁcant role in the mor-
ally relevant behavior of children and adolescents
(e.g., Hoffman, 2000; Krettenauer et al., 2008; Malti
& Latzko, 2010). Age did not moderate the relation
between moral emotion attributions and social
behavior. On theoretical grounds, one would expect
developmental changes to be most common during
early to middle childhood, as the ﬁrst studies exam-
ining the relation between moral emotion attribu-
tions and social behavior found that this is the time
when children frequently change from positive to
negative emotion attributions (Nunner-Winkler &
Sodian, 1988). More recent longitudinal studies
suggest that moral emotion attributions stabilize
during mid-adolescence (Krettenauer et al., 2011).
This ﬁnding suggests that moral emotion attribu-
tions likely reﬂect individual differences in morally
relevant behavioral dispositions rather than mere
deﬁcits in the cognitive ability to take the perspec-
tive of self and other. This does not mean that
moral emotion attributions do not depend on cogni-
tive development: Research has repeatedly docu-
mented that moral emotion attributions may
crucially depend on theory-of-mind development
and the ability to coordinate perspectives of self
and others in young children (Krettenauer et al.,
2008). However, even if children have developed
the cognitive prerequisites to attribute moral emo-
tions, our ﬁndings indicate that links between inter-
individual differences in moral emotion attributions
and morally relevant behavior remain stable from
childhood to late adolescence. This contradicts the
view that younger children’s emotion attributions
reﬂect a lack of moral motivation that eventually is
outgrown in the course of development. Rather, the
ﬁndings indirectly support the view that young
children often have moral motivation, for example,
as a result of the ability to feel empathy (Eisenberg
et al., 2006). Thus, the ﬁndings of this meta-analysis
are most supportive of the theoretical notion that
moral emotion attributions reﬂect interindividual
differences in morally relevant behavioral disposi-
tions across various age groups. Future research is
needed to disentangle the social and psychological
factors (i.e., cognitive, emotional, motivational, and
behavioral) that lead to differences in strength of
moral emotion attributions across development.
Notably, the effect sizes we found are similar to
those found for comparable relations in other stud-
ies on empathy and social behavior; these effect
sizes were also in the low to moderate range. Spe-
ciﬁcally, Eisenberg and Miller (1987) reported corre-
lations between .10 and .36 for the relation between
empathy and prosocial behavior, and Miller and
Eisenberg (1988) found correlations between .06
and .46 for empathy in relation to antisocial
behavior. One reason as to why moral emotion
attributions have been found to be related to (im)
moral action might be that moral emotion attribu-
tions have been operationalized as self-evaluative
emotions with both cognitive and affective aspects
(Tangney et al., 2007). As such, they not only
involve an other-oriented affective reaction but also
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reﬂect the validity of moral rules and obligations
(Malti, Gummerman, et al., 2009). It has been
argued that this internalized moral knowledge,
when combined with an affective reaction toward
the transgression, can create a sense of personal
responsibility that is likely to lead to (im)moral con-
duct (Malti & Keller, 2010). Our meta-analysis sup-
ports this assumption and adds new knowledge by
showing that, like empathy, moral emotion attribu-
tions are moderately related to prosocial and antiso-
cial conduct.
Interestingly, the effect sizes of the relations
between moral emotion attribution and prosocial
and antisocial behavior were larger for antisocial
than those for prosocial behavior. This ﬁnding cor-
responds with the results reported by Krettenauer
and Johnston (2011) and by Krettenauer and Jia (in
press), both of whom demonstrated that negatively
charged moral emotion attributions are stronger
when one is engaging in antisocial behavior than
when one is failing to act prosocially. For positively
charged emotions such as pride, the opposite pat-
tern was found. The fact that our meta-analysis
included only negative emotion attributions might
account for the difference in effect sizes. Theoreti-
cally, negatively charged moral emotion attributions
such as guilt are anticipated after rule-violating,
aggressive behavior. Positively charged moral emo-
tion attributions such as pride might be more clo-
sely related to prosocial behavior. Future studies
are needed to disentangle how negatively and posi-
tively valenced emotion attributions in the moral
domain relate to prosocial and antisocial behavior.
Our hypothesis that self-attributed moral
emotions would be related more strongly than
other-attributed moral emotions to prosocial and
antisocial behavior was partly conﬁrmed. The type
of moral emotion attribution made no difference for
prosocial behavior, but the d for the relation of
moral emotions to antisocial behavior was higher if
the emotions were self-attributed than if they were
other-attributed. The ﬁnding that self-reported
moral emotion expectancies had a stronger effect on
antisocial behavior than did emotions attributed to
hypothetical wrongdoers is important and gives
new insights into the relation between moral emo-
tion attributions and antisocial behavioral tenden-
cies. Self-attributed moral emotions following
transgressions might be perceived as personally
binding and, as such, might help a person refrain
from engaging in antisocial behavior. Other-
attributed emotions might be perceived as less per-
sonally obligating (Keller et al., 2003). In contrast,
children who behave prosocially may see emotions
attributed to hypothetical wrongdoers in the same
way as if they were attributed to the self (see Malti
et al., 2007). Alternatively, the sample size might
have been too small to detect differences in the rela-
tion between moral emotion attributions and proso-
cial behavior.
Another important ﬁnding is that there were
large differences in effect size across studies.
Related meta-analyses of empathy and prosocial
and antisocial behavior have likewise reported a
wide range of effect sizes (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987;
Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). A considerable amount
of this between-studies variance was explained by
additional moderator variables. A signiﬁcant mod-
erator for prosocial behavior in our analysis was
coding of moral emotion attribution. Studies that
included measures on the intensity of moral emo-
tion attributions showed larger effect sizes than did
studies that relied on either positive or negative
scoring or a combined emotion-reasoning score.
This is an interesting and novel ﬁnding; the inten-
sity of emotion ratings perhaps reﬂects the strength
of experienced moral emotions, which may relate
more closely to actual behavioral tendencies than
simple reports of type of emotion (i.e., positive vs.
negative) or more reﬂexive emotion scores (includ-
ing justiﬁcations of emotions).
Another moderator of prosocial behavior was
study format. We found higher effect sizes in cross-
sectional studies than in longitudinal studies. This
ﬁnding is difﬁcult to explain, especially since previ-
ous related longitudinal studies on empathic rea-
soning suggest that the relation between empathic
reasoning and prosociality becomes clearer with
age (e.g., Eisenberg, Lennon, & Roth, 1983).
However, our meta-analysis did not document any
age-related effects on the relation between moral
emotion attribution and prosocial behavior. Thus,
these inconsistencies might likely be due to the
effects of selective attrition in the longitudinal
research included in the present meta-analysis,
which may relate to limited variance and related
smaller effect sizes. Furthermore, effect sizes in
unpublished manuscripts were higher than in pub-
lished manuscripts. This somewhat surprising ﬁnd-
ing indicates, again, that it is unlikely that
publication bias (i.e., larger effects in published
studies) has threatened our ﬁndings for prosocial
behavior.
For aggressive behavior, signiﬁcant moderators in
our meta-analysis were study type (i.e., experimental
vs. correlational design) and coding of moral emo-
tion attribution. Experiments had a larger effect size
than correlational studies. Given the small sample
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size, this ﬁnding needs to be interpreted cautiously.
It might reﬂect differences in methodological rigor.
Regarding coding of moral emotion attribution, the
intensity of emotion ratings had a larger effect size
than that of dichotomous positive versus negative
ratings and combined emotion-reasoning scores.
Again, perhaps intensity of emotion ratings reﬂects
the actual perceived arousal and strength of an expe-
rienced emotion, and, thus, such ratings are more
closely related to antisocial behavior.
Conclusions and Future Directions
The present study provides new information on
the relations between moral emotion attributions and
the prosocial and antisocial behavior of children and
adolescents. Since moral emotion attributions, as
assessed in the happy-victimizer paradigm provide
key information on how affective-moral experiences
are linked to moral reasoning and morally relevant
behavior, this analysis is timely. Our reliance on
mixed-effects models allowed for greater generaliz-
ability of our ﬁndings than would have been the case
had we used ﬁxed-effects models (Card et al., 2008;
Hedges & Vevea, 1998). However, the models we
used still assume that the studies we included are a
random sample of the population of studies; to the
extent that they are not, our results are biased (Card
et al., 2008, p. 1208). This observation brings to light
another potential limitation of our meta-analysis that
merits consideration. A well-known threat to the
validity of meta-analyses is publication bias (Rosen-
thal, 1995). Nonsigniﬁcant study outcomes are gener-
ally underreported in the literature. If our attempts to
retrieve unpublished studies failed, we may have dis-
proportionally missed nonsigniﬁcant ﬁndings. How-
ever, we went to great lengths to retrieve unpublished
studies by searching dissertation databases and by
soliciting unpublished studies from researchers in the
ﬁeld. As a result, 14 of the 42 studies in our sample
were unpublished, a reasonably high percentage
(33%). Finally, even if there was a publication bias, it
is unlikely that it inﬂuenced the robust main ﬁndings
of our meta-analysis, because the fail-safe number
indicates that the overall effect would have still been
signiﬁcant if had we included a large number of null
studies.
Our literature review prior to the meta-analysis
identiﬁed some important research gaps in this area
of developmental research. Previous studies were
predominantly conducted with unrepresentative,
middle-class samples (for an exception, see Malti,
Gummerman, et al., 2009). Future studies reﬂecting
ethnic and cultural diversity are therefore war-
ranted. In addition, the majority of research we
reviewed relied on concurrent data. Unfortunately,
longitudinal investigations are rare and those that
do exist are so different in methodology that mean-
ingful meta-analytic combination is not yet possible.
We strongly urge additional longitudinal research
using a wide range of measurement strategies.
Although our meta-analysis revealed that there is a
consistent relation betweenmoral emotion attributions
and social behavior across development, the question
regarding possible intervening mechanisms remains
unanswered. For example, older children may rely
more heavily on anticipated consequential emotions
following actual behavior because as a result of
increased perspective-taking skills, whereas younger
children might predominantly rely on emotional out-
comes of previous (im)moral behaviors (Baumeister
et al., 2007). Research on moral emotion attributions
has not systematically distinguished between the roles
that consequential emotions and anticipatory emotion
expectancies play in children’s and adolescents’ social
behavior (Malti &Ongley, in press). Future research on
the role of anticipatory and consequential emotions in
children’s social behavior is warranted.
Finally, most of the existing happy-victimizer
research has focused on moral emotion attributions
in antisocial contexts, such as stealing or hitting.
Utilizing research designs that systematically vary
prosocial and antisocial contexts might help to dis-
entangle the role of situational context as a modera-
tor in the relation between moral emotion
attributions and prosocial and antisocial behavior.
In summary, our meta-analytic review has con-
tributed substantially to clarifying the role of moral
emotion attributions in morally relevant behavior
during childhood and adolescence. This synthesis
provides new information about moral emotion
attributions and their role in moral development.
This information is important for clarifying the con-
ceptual ambiguities surrounding moral emotion
attributions. This work is also of value because it
points to directions for future research. Clearly,
more longitudinal research on the role of moral
emotion attributions in social behavior is warranted
if we are to better understand their role in the gene-
sis of individual differences in such behavior.
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